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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

IN RE ROBERTO D.B.: A GESTATIONAL CARRIER IS NOT
REQUIRED TO BE LISTED ON A BIRTH CERTIFICATE
BECAUSE THE MARYLAND EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
DEMANDS THAT MARYLAND PATERNITY STATUTES,
WHICH ALLOW MEN TO CHALLENGE PATERNITY,
EXTEND TO WOMEN.
By: Patricia Calomeris
In a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a gestational carrier is not required to be listed on a child's
birth certificate. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 923 A.2d 115
(2007). Furthermore, the Court held that Maryland paternity statutes
do not violate the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment ("E.R.A."),
because the process by which a male may challenge paternity may be
employed by women as well. Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 283, 923 A.2d
at 124. Lastly, the Court held that the best interest of the child
("BIC") standard did not apply to the instant case, because only one
parent sought custody, and that parent was not found to be unfit. Id. at
285, 923 A.2d at 126.
On December 18, 2000 Roberto d.B. ("Roberto") initiated an in
vitro fertilization procedure, in which his sperm fertilized two eggs
from an egg donor. The eggs were implanted in another woman's
uterus. Neither the egg donor nor the gestational carrier, who had no
genetic connection to the two children ultimately born, intended to
gain custody. Upon the birth of the children, the hospital submitted
birthing information to the Maryland Division of Vital Records
("MDVR"), so that the MDVR could issue birth certificates for the
children. The MDVR's policy requires that it report the gestational
carrier as the mother on the birth certificate, unless a court order
authorizes otherwise. Absent a court order in this case, the MDVR
refused to grant Roberto's request to omit the gestational carrier's
name from the birth certificates.
Consequently, Roberto petitioned the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County to have the gestational carrier's name removed
from the birth certificate, and to have the court authorize the MDVR to
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report only his name. The gestational carrier, the putative appellee,
joined Roberto in this petition. The circuit court denied Roberto's
motion, and held that there was no Maryland case law that would
allow it to authorize the omission of a mother's name from a birth
certificate. The circuit court further held that it was in the best interest
of the child to have a mother named on the birth certificate. Roberto
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland on grounds that
Maryland paternity statutes, unless interpreted to extend to women,
violated the E.R.A. The Court of Appeals of Maryland issued
certiorari, prior to the commencement of proceedings in the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, to examine the constitutional issue
claimed by the appellant.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the circuit court and
held that gestational carriers need not be listed as mothers on the birth
certificates of children they carry to term. Roberto dB., 399 Md. at
285, 923 A.2d at 126. The Court of Appeals of Maryland determined
that section 4-211 of the Health General Article of the Maryland Code
("section 4-211") does not prevent the Court from making such an
omission. Roberto dB., 399 Md. at 278, 923 A.2d at 121-22. Section
4-211 states that authorization of a new birth certificate may be
obtained if significant proof has been entered that the child was born
in the state and a court has entered an order concerning the parentage
of the child. Roberto dB., 399 Md. at 278,923 A.2d at 121-22.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland interpreted section 4-211 to
mean that Maryland law "accommodates, if not contemplates, a birth
certificate on which the mother is not identified." Roberto dB., 399
Md. at 278, 923 A.2d at 121. The "parentage" language of section 4211 does not set limitations as to which parent or how many parents
must be listed on the birth certificate. Roberto dB., 399 Md. at 278,
923 A.2d at 122. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the MDVR
had no objections to removing the gestational carrier's name from the
birth certificate, provided that this action was authorized by the Court.
Roberto dB, 399 Md. at 294, 923 A.2d at 131.
Next, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that because
Maryland paternity statutes may be interpreted as extending to women,
the statutes do not violate the E.R.A. Roberto dB., 399 Md. at 283,
923 A.2d at 124. The E.R.A. states that "[e]quality of rights under the
law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex." Roberto dB, 399
Md. at 274-75,923 A.2d at 120 (quoting Md. Decl. of Rights, art. 46).
Roberto contended that section 5-1001 of the Family Law Article of
the Maryland Code ("section 5-1001") lists the necessary steps for a
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man to challenge paternity and emphasized that there is no language in
this section, or other sections, that afforded women a similar
procedure. Roberto dB., 399 Md. at 275, 923 A.2d at 120 (quoting
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1001 (West 2006)).
In considering Roberto's contention, the Court found the E.R.A.
prohibits "the granting of more rights to one sex than to the other."
Roberto dB., 399 Md. at 283, 923 A.2d at 124. The Court relied on
Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133, 716 A.2d 1029 (1998), to further
conclude that imposing a burden on, or granting a benefit to, one sex
and not the other, without substantial justification, is a violation of the
E.R.A. Roberto dB., 399 Md. at 279-80, 923 A.2d at 122-23.
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the paternity statutes, as
written, did not contemplate the complexity of legal issues arising
from modem reproductive technologies. Id. at 279, 923 A.2d at 122.
Consequently, the language of the paternity statutes restricted, rather
than protected, parents' rights. Id. at 279, 923 A.2d at 122. The
Court, therefore, held that the paternity statutes must be "construed to
apply equally to both males and females" to comply with the E.R.A.
and keep up with new technology. Id. at 283-84,923 A.2d at 124-25.
In response to the majority, the dissent argued that the majority
created an "intent test" to determine parentage, which would allow
women and men to deny parentage merely because they did not intend
to be parents. Id. at 284 n.15, 923 A.2d at 125 n.15. In contemplation
of this issue, the majority countered that a mother's denial of maternity
must be based on her genetic relation to the child. Id. at 284 n.15, 923
A.2d at 125 n.15. The Court further noted that Maryland paternity
statutes, as they are currently written, do not explicitly include intent
as a factor for determination of parentage. Id. at 284 n.15, 923 A.2d
125 n.15.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the BIC
standard was not applicable to the instant case. Id. at 285, 923 A.2d at
126. The Court opined that the BIC standard is typically used when
there is a custody dispute between parents or third parties, or if a
parent is found to be unfit. Id. at 285-91, 923 A.2d at 126-29. In
rejecting the circuit court's decision, the Court held that in the instant
case, the BIC standard is not applicable because there is no custody
dispute among the parties. Id. at 292, 923 A.2d at 130. In this case,
the gestational carrier wished to completely relinquish her maternal
rights, and she established that she never intended to possess such
rights. Id. at 292, 923 A.2d at 130. Additionally, the Court held that
there was nothing in the record that would prove that Roberto was an
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unfit parent, and so it was inappropriate for the circuit court to
interfere with his request for relief by imposing the BIC standard. Id.
at 292-93,923 A.2d at 130.
In In re Roberto d.B., the Court of Appeals of Maryland tackled an
issue that has arisen due to modem technology. To accommodate the
emerging trend of artificial reproduction and to avoid an E.R.A.
conflict, the Court interpreted Maryland paternity statutes as extending
to women. The Court's holding, however, may have addressed a
matter of public policy that should be left to the legislature's
determination. Therefore, this opinion suggests that Maryland courts
may be pursuing a more active role of interpreting statutes in order to
advance public policy, rather than leaving important family issues to
the legislature. Furthermore, the case demonstrates how emerging
reproductive options may cause an increase in cases that address nongenetic relation, and may effectuate change in custody and parentage
laws in the future.

